Trump is a symptom, not the cause, of current disruption in
the international system. Put the attention-seeker to one side, and instead focus
on the underlying upheaval.
The Trump phenomenon has widened eyes. Yet with eyes
wide open we remain distracted by his noisy, portly figure and neglect the
panorama.
At international fora since November’s US Presidential
election, more so since the inauguration in January, discussion has focussed on
the Trump effect, and how, and how long it will take, to restore things to
‘normal’. ‘Normal’ being the status quo of relations prior to the Trump
ascendancy.
‘Normal’ being a status quo that isn’t coming back. Ever.
Trump is a dangerous attention-seeking blip on the
landscape. But he’s a symptom of deeper trends undermining the post-Cold
War international order and presaging its
re-constitution.
Take just one of those trends: the increasingly isolationist posture of the US.
This posture, abandoning
its three-quarters of a century as ‘leader of the free world’ and guarantor of
the liberal democratic tradition, coupled with its relative decline as the
leading world power, means its mantle, the ‘primacy amongst equals’ of the US, once abandoned, will not be readily re-assumed. Having deferred to isolationism, should the US
later decide to re-invigorate its international program, it will be welcomed
into a loose association of liberal democratic states, no longer as their unparalleled
leader but only as a member of that tradition whose former stewardship is recalled
with respect.
Isolationist tendencies, on the march in the US and now
ascendant, are disrupting the international system and shifting the modus
operandi of the liberal democratic quorum in ways that won’t revert.
Those ‘in the room’ at international fora need take this on
board: widespread disturbances, cracks and breaks in the system means things
are never going back to ‘normal’. Not even back to a ‘re-ordered normal’. Perhaps
a ‘re-structured normal’. Ultimately a ‘re-constituted normal’, but who knows
when?
The period between the two world wars of the twentieth
century illustrates this point. Not in a direct, substitute the US for the
British Empire, China for the US, Russia for Germany, populism for populism,
zany leader for zany leader way. But in the sense that the two periods have in
common both widespread systemic disruption and an unpreparedness by many of
those working the system (and the room) to accept or even acknowledge the
shifts underway.
A century ago, ideologies, world views and world orders began
a process of rapid and major change, as did many social orders within states, entering what Hobsbawm described as an 'age of catastrophe' that continued until the end of the second world war. Inter-state
alliances pre-existing the first war were entirely re-ordered, and in some
cases re-ordered several times, by the end of the second. And even where those
alliances weren’t substantially re-ordered, the interests and ideologies, the
reasons, underwriting them had shifted regardless.
The globalised ideologies that underwrote the ‘rules of the
game’ were usurped, and the social systems which maintained them within states
were exposed, dismantled, reconstructed, even revolutionised. The political and social potential of the masses was realised to an extent rarely if ever previously
seen. Many entitlements of the ‘ruling classes’ were swept away, by social
movements, political movements, economics, by the tides of war. New ruling cliques
emerged, some briefly, some permanently. In the post-war period, vestiges of
the old order which remained, the colonies for example, were unwinding and
their sustaining ideologies in rapid and inexorable decline.
During the generation-long inter-war period, Carr's 'twenty years crisis', populism,
parochialism, ideologies, came to the fore and thrust into the limelight states
which had previously played peripheral or subsidiary roles. Fascism, Communism
and other mass movements became foci for international relations and empire
building, as did the enlightenment beacon of ‘liberal democracy’ illluminate
another focal point. States rapidly or gradually slipped into and out of the
orbit of one or another of these foci.
The ideological status and realistic impact of international
institutions waxed and waned throughout.
This illustration is not a prescriptive analogy. The history of the current period is yet to be written, and won’t be written by me. However, if it begins with the rise of al Qaeda, it is unlikely to be conveniently bookmarked by victory in a ‘War on Terror’.
Any serious historian, I’m sure, could point to other periods of history similarly tumultuous as the inter-war years. That does not detract from the merit of the comparison drawn, which illustrates the irrevocable change underway. To understand current shifts in the international system, the inter-war period provides a useful lens.
In the annals of future historians, by time the contemporary upheavals come to an end, the international order of states and their relations, of interests, of ideology, will be written in terms yet to be anticipated.
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